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WHOSE BODY IS IT ANYWAY? HUMAN
CELLS AND THE STRANGE EFFECTS OF
PROPERTY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW
Robin Feldman*
Whatever else I might own in this world, it would seem intuitively obvious
that I own the cells of my body. Where else could the notion of ownership begin,
other than with the components of the tangible corpus that all would recognize as
"me"? The law, however, does not view the issue so neatly and clearly, particu-
larly when cells are no longer in my body. As so often happens in law, we have
reached this point, not by design, but by the piecemeal development of disparate
notions that, when gathered together, form a strange and disconcerting picture.
This Article examines both property and intellectual property doctrines in
relation to human cells that are no longer within the body. In particular, the Ar-
ticle discusses the Bilski decision, in the context of life science process patents,
and the Molecular Pathology case, in the context of gene patents. For patent law,
the Article concludes that the problem lies not with the fact that genes constitute
patentable subject matter, but rather with the extent of the rights that are granted.
For both property and intellectual property law, the Article concludes that a
more careful application of basic legal principles would better reflect the inter-
ests of society as a whole and the interests of individual human subjects, as well
as the interests of those who innovate.
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INTRODUCTION
There are many aspects of our lives over which we can exercise what can
be called ownership, control, or dominion. However one conceptualizes owner-
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ship, it is clear that people can hold such rights in many things, ranging from
more concrete items, such as automobiles, jewelry, or a plot of land, to more
abstract concepts, such as our labor, our writings, our innovations, and even our
commercial image.
Whatever else I might own in this world, however, it would seem intuitive-
ly obvious that I own the cells of my body. Where else could the notion of
ownership begin other than with the components of the tangible corpus that all
would recognize as "me"?
The law, however, does not view the issue so neatly or clearly. Through the
rambling pathways of property and intellectual property law, we are fast ap-
proaching the point at which just about anyone can have property rights in your
cells, except you. In addition, with some alteration, anyone can have intellec-
tual property rights in innovations related to the information contained therein,
but you do not.
I should be clear at the outset that I am talking about property and intellec-
tual property rights to cells when they are no longer in your body. The sanctity
of control over one's body remains reasonably intact, as long as the cells are
attached to you.1 When cells are no longer attached, however, the legal land-
scape shifts, and the resulting tableau has a strong effect on the choices one can
make with those cells that do remain in the body.
As so often happens in law, we have reached this point not by design but
by the piecemeal development of disparate notions. Various doctrinal strands
have emerged in isolation of each other, each appearing to solve a particular
problem in its own domain. When gathered together, however, the doctrines
form a strange and disconcerting picture.
Consider a human cell, or a group of cells, being used for research purpos-
es. It could be a blood sample or perhaps a piece of tissue left over from a biop-
sy. When a researcher is working with a sample of human blood or tissue, the
researcher, or the lab, has a property right in those cells. Similarly, if the re-
searcher isolates a protein or a segment of DNA from that sample, the research-
er or the lab has property rights in the tangible isolated elements.
Others may ask for a sample of the tissue or the cell lines developed from
that tissue. 2 These items are treated under contract law according to agreements
related to the transfer of tangible property, commonly called "material transfer
agreements."
1. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966) (stating that the Fourth
Amendment prohibits compelled intrusions into the body for blood to be analyzed for alco-
hol content if intrusions are not justified in the circumstances or are made in an improper
manner). But see UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 11(a), 9B U.L.A. 445 (2001) ("The court may,
and upon request of a party shall, require the child, mother, or alleged father to submit to
blood tests.").
2. A "cell line" is a cell culture that can proliferate indefinitely. See BRUCE ALBERTS
ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 474 (4th ed. 2002).
1378 [Vol. 63:1377
HUMAN CELLS AND PROPERTY LAW
In addition to property rights, a researcher who isolates something from the
sample also may be able to apply for patent rights on that isolated product. If
the researcher successfully manipulates the cell, forming a novel cell line or
producing a new protein, the researcher may receive a patent on the protein or
cell line as a new product.3 In addition, information from the coding sequences
in those cells may help form the basis of a diagnostic or therapeutic patent. In
short, a researcher with a human tissue sample may have property rights in that
sample. Through observation, isolation, and manipulation of the sample, the
researcher may also obtain intellectual property rights.
How about the human who contributed the sample in the first place? The
California Supreme Court has refused to grant property rights to individuals in
the cells of their bodies when those cells are no longer in their bodies.4 A fed-
eral district court reached a similar result.5 The discussion in the cases suggests
distaste for the possibility of treating human body parts as a form of property,
as well as serious concerns about interfering with advancements in medical
science.6 As a result, the person whose body provided the sample has no prop-
erty rights, although we seem to have no problem giving others property rights
in those cells.
The human who contributed the cells has no intellectual property rights ei-
ther. Patent rights are based on manipulation or use of elements within those
cells. The cells as they exist in one's body are in a state of nature and cannot be
the subject of patent rights.7 Thus, although others can end up with intellectual
property rights related to those cells, the person who contributed the cells can
claim no such rights by virtue of his or her association with the cells.
3. See Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1321 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (addressing patents on a non-naturally occurring human erythropoietin product made
with recombinant DNA technology). "Recombinant DNA technology" refers to techniques
to isolate, clone, characterize, engineer, and screen DNA and study gene functions. See
ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 2, at 492-93; see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,
310 (1980) (granting patent rights on bacterium produced through genetic engineering and
having properties not found elsewhere in nature in that combination).
4. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 489 (Cal. 1990).
5. See Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d
1064, 1074 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (noting similarity to Moore and holding that donors had no
property interest in body tissue and genetic information voluntarily given). In finding, how-
ever, that "the property right in blood and tissue samples also evaporates once the sample is
voluntarily given to a third party," id. at 1075, the Greenberg court implicitly suggested that
there might be a property right at some point. Otherwise, there would be nothing that could
"evaporate."
6. See id. at 1076 (noting the potential to cripple medical research); Moore, 793 P.2d
at 493-94 (expressing concerns over creating disabling civil liability for the infant biotech-
nology industry); id. at 497-98 (Arabian, J., concurring) (noting that the case raises "troub-
ling" questions related to "uplift[ing] or degrad[ing] the 'unique human persona"'); id. at 515
(Mosk, J., dissenting) (discussing laws related to slavery, indentured servitude, and debtor's
prison in the context of the profound ethical imperative to respect the human body).
7. Cf Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1076-77 (dismissing the claim that a registry of
people who had Canavan disease constituted a trade secret).
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Human beings do have some rights in relation to the cells of their body
when the cells are no longer in the body. Those rights, however, generally are
grounded in notions of the fiduciary duty that a doctor owes to a patient and are
frequently centered on the doctor's obligation to obtain informed consent.' Al-
though the question has not been approached precisely in this manner, humans
do not seem to have any particular right to their cells or to the information con-
tained in their cells, outside of their relationship with health care providers.
I have suggested, in a different forum, that the intersection of interests in
this area would be well served by a reconceptualization of the relationship be-
tween the state and the individual.9 Much as one might hope for such a para-
digm shift, however, I recognize the importance of working with the tools that
we have. Significant progress can be made by a more careful and considered
application of current property and intellectual property doctrines. Specifically,
in our enthusiasm for the truly groundbreaking and spectacular work of the
scientific community, we have, at times, granted rights that are far too expan-
sive. In the process, we have lost sight of the interests of the individual and the
interests of scientific progress on the whole. Rushing to reward and incentivize,
we have created opportunities for patent holders to arrogate to themselves large
swaths of territory, well beyond what should be permissible, and they have tak-
en advantage of our invitation. Perhaps it is time to reconsider our approach.
Part I of the Article will examine doctrines of property law in relation to
ownership of human cells that are no longer within the body. The Part con-
cludes that under traditional property law concepts, individuals should have a
continuing property interest in their own cells. Part II of the Article will ex-
amine the more challenging question of intellectual property rights in innova-
tions related to cells and cellular components outside of their natural state in the
human body. The Part concludes that modem patent decisions are granting pa-
tent rights far too broadly to those who innovate with human cells, cellular
components, and cellular information. A more careful and considered applica-
tion of patent law doctrines would limit the patent rights granted, which would
better reflect the interests of society as a whole in maintaining access to the
building blocks of science for scientific research and innovation. Although in-
dividuals do not have patent rights in their own cells, a proper application of
patent law principles would benefit individuals, at least indirectly, through in-
creased competition and access.
8. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 483.
9. See Robin Feldman, Coming to the Community, in IMAGINING NEW LEGALMES
(Austin Sarat ed., forthcoming June 2011).
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I. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN HUMAN CELLS
Henrietta Lacks was a poor black woman who died of a particularly viru-
lent form of cervical cancer in the 1950s.10 Mrs. Lacks died eight months after
she was diagnosed with cancer, leaving behind a husband and five children. Al-
though she would never know, Mrs. Lacks also left an astounding legacy for
medical science. Using the aggressive nature of Mrs. Lacks's cancer cells, re-
searchers developed a method for reproducing human cells in the lab. Mrs.
Lacks's cells became the first human cells to reproduce prolifically in a labora-
tory setting, and scientists have reproduced some fifty million metric tons of
her cells over time. 1 The so-called HeLa cell line has contributed to major de-
velopments in the field of life sciences, including the polio vaccine, cancer
treatments, and in vitro fertilization.12 As one book reviewer noted, Henrietta
Lacks became "the godmother of virology and then biotech, benefiting practi-
cally anyone who's ever taken a pill stronger than aspirin."1 3
In short, research on Mrs. Lacks's cells paved the way for a wealth of stun-
ning developments in the life sciences industry. Critics have noted, however,
that her family has not shared in that bounty.14
A similar set of facts formed the basis of Moore v. Regents of the Universi-
ty of California.15 In 1976, John Moore was treated for leukemia at UCLA
Hospital. In the course of his treatment, as well as follow-up care for seven
years, doctors at UCLA Hospital removed his spleen and took samples of tissue
and blood.16 The doctors told Mr. Moore that the procedures were necessary
for treatment of his life-threatening cancer. They did not, however, tell him that
his cells were unusual and offered great potential for scientific research.17
Working on cells from Mr. Moore, researchers at UCLA established the
"Mo" cell line. By the time the case came to trial, UCLA had received hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars in revenue from the cell line, and experts esti-
mated that the value of the line could reach into the billions.18
Mr. Moore sued the medical center and his physicians asserting a variety of
claims, including ones related to his property rights. In the property claim, Mr.
Moore asserted that he had never consented to the use of his cells in potentially
10. See REBECCA SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRETTA LACKS 3 (2010); Dwight
Garner, A Woman's Undying Gift to Science, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 3, 2010, at Cl (reviewing
SKLOOT, supra); Lisa Margonelli, Eternal Life, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 5, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/07/books/reviewlMargonelli-t.html (same).
it. See Margonelli, supra note 10.
12. See sources cited supra note 10.
13. Margonelli, supra note 10.
14. See sources cited supra note 10.
15. 793 P.2d 479, 480-82 (Cal. 1990).
16. See id. at 480-81.
17. See id. at 483.
18. See id. at 482.
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lucrative medical research and that using them in this manner constituted a
conversion of his personal property.19 As described above, the California Su-
preme Court rejected the claim, concluding that whatever rights Mr. Moore
might have had, they did not amount to property or ownership rights.20
In reaching its decision, the court essentially used the following logic:
When cells are removed from a person's body, the disposition of those cells is
limited in that (1) the person cannot sell them under some circumstances, and
(2) after the cells are used for research, they must be disposed of according to
health department guidelines. With property rights, however, one expects to see
an array of rights, including the right to dispose of the property. If disposition
rights are missing or sufficiently circumscribed, one must conclude that what-
ever rights may exist, they are not property rights.21
The court did conclude that Mr. Moore's suit might go forward based on
causes of action related to a doctor's fiduciary duty to the patient and obligation
to obtain informed consent.22 Although the case settled for an undisclosed sum,
experts have estimated that the potential damages from a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty would be far lower than the damages Mr. Moore had sought on
the basis of property rights.23
The logic in Moore has been appropriately criticized, beginning with the
dissent in the case.24 It is certainly true that modem property law scholars think
of property as a bundle of rights with four key attributes: use, possession, ex-
clusion, and disposition. The extent of those four attributes, however, can vary
19. Id. at 487.
20. See id. at 492; see also supra note 6 (discussing the dissent in Moore and a federal
district court decision in Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hospital Research Institute, Inc.).
21. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 492 ("By restricting how excised cells may be used and
requiring their eventual destruction, the statute eliminates so many of the rights ordinarily
attached to property that one cannot simply assume that what is left amounts to 'property' or
'ownership' .... ).
22. See id. at 483.
23. See Maxwell J. Mehlman, Moore v. Regents of the University of California, in
PROPERTY STORIES 41, 53 (Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2004).
24. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 506-23 (Mosk, J., dissenting); see also E. RICHARD GOLD,
BODY PARTS: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS
(1996); Donna M. Gitter, Ownership of Human Tissue: A Proposal for Federal Recognition
ofHuman Research Participants' Property Rights in Their Biological Material, 61 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 257, 281 (2004) (criticizing Moore and describing the importance of recogniz-
ing property rights and providing compensation for research participants); Charlotte H. Har-
rison, Neither Moore Nor the Market: Alternative Models for Compensating Contributors of
Human Tissue, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 77, 81 (2002) (noting three principal objections to
Moore); Laura M. Ivey, Moore v. Regents of the University of California: Insufficient Pro-
tection of Patients' Rights in the Biotechnological Market, 25 GA. L. REv. 489, 498 (1991)
(discussing Justice Mosk's dissent); Mehlman, supra note 23, at 41-56 (discussing the
Moore holding and how it continues to affect biomedicine); Jeffery A. Potts, Note, Moore v.
Regents of the University of California: Expanded Disclosure, Limited Property Rights, 86
Nw. U. L. REv. 453, 453 (1992) (disagreeing with Moore's refusal to allow a cause of action
for conversion of property).
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considerably. They are often circumscribed, and this is just as true for disposi-
tion rights as for the other attributes of ownership. In fact, the dissent lists a va-
riety of examples in which disposition rights are limited for a particular type of
tangible property and yet one would still think of that item as property. 25
For example, if I have a bottle of prescription medicine, it would certainly
be treated as my personal property. I would have the right to possess, use, and
exclude others from the medication. My right to dispose of the medication,
however, is quite circumscribed. I am not permitted to sell it, and I cannot re-
spond to someone who complains about how boring the Symposium is by say-
ing, "Here, take my Vicodin."26 I cannot even flush the unused medication
down the sink, in some jurisdictions, but would be required to dispose of any
unused portion at an appropriate facility. Although the rights of disposition for
prescription medicine are severely curtailed, that fact does not preclude treat-
ment as personal property.
In addition, the person from whom the cells have been obtained must have
some rights in relation to those cells, and such rights cannot be completely ex-
plained through the fiduciary duty of the physician. Mr. Moore could have con-
tracted with researchers himself to explore and exploit the information con-
tained in his cells,27 regardless of whether those researchers were his
physicians. From a more graphic perspective, suppose a man severs his finger
while sawing wood in his backyard. One would expect that he has the right to
ask that the finger be reattached, as opposed to any other potential uses or mod-
es of disposition, including use for research. The man's priority right to those
cells cannot possibly be connected to rights of privacy, nondisclosure, or in-
formed consent. The man would claim the finger, not because it contains in-
formation that should be kept private or because he did not properly obtain his
own consent before slicing off his finger. He would claim the finger because it
is his.
One could, of course, argue that we should have property rules only for
body parts that have the potential to be reattached or reused in some way. At
some point, however, the twists and turns necessary to maintain a particular ap-
proach undermine the legitimacy of that approach in the first place. The better
analysis is to acknowledge the obvious. Cells separated from the human body
are tangible property that must, as an initial matter, belong to someone. They
cannot simply spring forth as tangible property of a lab or a researcher without
having been the property of anyone else prior to that point. The logical person
for initial ownership of cells is the person from whose body the cells originated.
25. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 509-10 & nn.6, 8 & 10 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (observing
that a homeowner association's right of first refusal over a proposed sale limits the disposi-
tion of real property and that a sportsman's right to give away-but not sell-his fish or
game limits the disposition of personal property).
26. Vicodin is a narcotic pain reliever available only by prescription.
27. Moore, 793 P.2d at 510 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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For public policy reasons, society may want to restrict people from using, sell-
ing, or disposing of those cells in certain ways. We take that approach for many
different types of tangible personal property, however, from prescription drugs
to used motor oil.
Perhaps one of the strongest arguments in favor of property rights treat-
ment for cells outside the human body is that we actually treat them like prop-
erty. As described above, when research laboratories transfer physical mate-
rials, such as cell samples, those samples are transferred subject to contractual
arrangements known as "material transfer agreements." In addition to regulat-
ing intellectual property rights that may arise from experimentation with the
materials, the agreements treat the physical cells as they would other types of
tangible property. 28
It defies common sense to say that an individual lab can hold property
rights in the tangible cells removed from a person's body while the person
whose body supplied the cells cannot. If cells are treated as tangible property
for the purposes of material transfer agreements among labs, they should also
be treated as tangible property for the purposes of a transfer from the human
whose body is supplying the cells.
One could argue that giving individuals property rights in the cells of their
bodies when those cells are no longer in their bodies has the potential to endan-
ger basic concepts of human dignity. Treating elements of our body as property
could encourage commercialization of those elements, which could erode the
reverence for human life that infuses a number of American legal doctrines,
particularly those that forbid ownership of human beings in the form of sla-
very.29 From a more practical standpoint, treating human cells as property
creates a risk that those in financial need will be coerced into selling parts of
their body, either by unscrupulous brokers or by the circumstances of their po-
verty, thereby surrendering or endangering their health.
If our concern truly lies with health risks to those who contribute their
cells to research, denying property rights is a remarkably overbroad solution to
the problem. If health risk is the concern, the law could forbid individuals from
selling or donating their cells if the transfer would endanger their health. Tak-
ing a more extreme approach, one could forbid individuals from transferring
cells unless those cells are removed as part of a procedure necessary for their
28. See, e.g., Alan B. Bennett, Wendy D. Streitz & Rafael A. Gacel, Specific Issues
with Material Transfer Agreements, in 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN HEALTH
AND AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION 697, 698 (Anatole Krattiger et al. eds., 2007) (explaining
that a material transfer agreement is a bailment, that is, a transfer of property without a trans-
fer of title, under which the provider maintains ownership of the transferred property); see
also Bruce Goldstein, Overview of Technology Development, in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE
OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 291, 299-300 (John I. Gallin & Frederick P. Ognibene eds., 2d ed.
2007) (describing material transfer agreements).
29. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 515-16 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (discussing this type of con-
cern).
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medical treatment. Such restrictions would be consistent with numerous other
rules in property law that limit the use or disposition of particular types of
property.
Denying individuals property rights in the cells of their body is also a re-
markably paternalistic approach to protecting individuals from coercion, par-
ticularly in light of the fact that we seem to grant property rights in those cells
to research labs. The law, in essence, would be saying: "You have no property
rights in the cells of your body when they are outside your body because we
must protect you from economic exploitation, but we are perfectly comfortable
letting biotechnology companies and research labs profit from the transfer of
such cells."
One could always argue that no one should have property rights in human
cells. The market solution of material transfer agreements, however, highlights
the property-like nature of these substances. Excised human cells are tangible
items, and someone must have legal dominion over them.
It is certainly true that giving individuals property rights in the cells of their
bodies when those cells are no longer in their bodies may have the effect of
giving more valuable remedies to those whose cells are used improperly. Re-
search protocols have adapted to the need for informed consent, however, and
they would adapt to this changing environment as well, perhaps by creating in-
demnification agreements for cells donated. Our enthusiasm and appreciation
for the miraculous advances of science should not blind us to the necessity of
thinking through the interests of the people whose cells provide the raw mate-
rials, nor should it obviate the necessity of ensuring that those raw materials are
properly obtained. Perhaps courts in the appropriate jurisdictions will feel
moved to revisit these issues, now that we have decades of experience with this
type of scientific research.
II. WHERE DOES NATURE END AND HUMAN INVENTION BEGIN?
The avenue of approach is quite different in the intellectual property realm.
In intellectual property, questions normally do not focus on the person from
whom the cells originate. Cells are analogous to the raw materials of invention,
and patent rights, after all, are granted only to those who take raw materials and
create something beyond what nature has provided. Individuals do not engage
in this type of creative activity by virtue of simply handing over their cells.
Nevertheless, an individual's ability to learn the details of his or her genetic
composition, and perhaps even the ability to alter that composition, will be
strongly affected by the outcome of current patent debates.
The operative question in patent law concerns the extent to which inventors
can tie up human genes and related substances, removing them for a period of
June 2011 ] 1385
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time from that which is free to all and reserved to none.30 This question is be-
ing thrust into the limelight as a result of two cases, Bilski v. Kappos31 and As-
sociation for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent & Trademark Of-
fice.32 The cases approach the same question from different angles: where does
nature end and human invention begin?
As I will describe below, Bilski has already drawn an extraordinary amount
of attention. In my view, one of the next chapters in the great Bilski saga will
involve personalized medicine inventions. This topic is looming on the horizon
because personalized medicine cases lie at the difficult intersection of computer
science and life science. Such inventions also bring together questions related
to proper subject matter for method inventions with questions related to proper
subject matter for product inventions. In other words, the topic implicates the
most difficult spot at the center of a number of swirling controversies that re-
quire a resolution of things courts have been unwilling or unable to resolve.
Part of the problem in resolving these issues lies in the analogies used.
Analogies between mechanical and biological inventions are always risky giv-
en the vast differences between the two realms. 33 Consider the basic problem
of framing genes in terms of either a product or a process, two basic categories
developed in relation to mechanical inventions. Genes are sequences of nucleo-
tides that operate as a set of instructions for carrying out some function in the
body. We would normally think of a set of instructions as a process, that is, a
method of doing something, rather than as a tangible product. Genes, however,
are as concrete and tangible as any machine we might build. It is almost as if
one could create a construction manual that operated on its own. Would we
treat it as a process or a product?
It takes a certain degree of mental gymnastics to contemplate a thing whose
nature is, to some extent, both that of a process and that of a product. The chal-
lenge is even greater when that thing must be described in abstract terms in a
patent application. It is not surprising that we have run into some difficulties,
and those difficulties are exacerbated in the field of personalized medicine
when the invention combines genes with computer-related inventions.
Molecular Pathology was a personalized medicine case. It involved inven-
tions related to gene mutations that create proteins associated with certain
30. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (containing the fre-
quently used language that "manifestations of ... nature [are] free to all men and reserved
exclusively to none" (omission in original) (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant
Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).
31. 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
32. 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
33. See Robin Feldman, Rethinking Rights in Biospace, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 2-5
(2005) (describing how an analogy taken from mechanical inventions is wreaking havoc in
cases related to biotechnology); cf ROBIN FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAW (2009)
(describing difficulties encountered when scientific definitions are imported into law without
a firm understanding of the assumptions inherent in those definitions).
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forms of breast and ovarian cancer. The proteins are commonly known as
BRCAl and BRCA2. In a fashion that has become all too familiar in the patent
world, the patent holder reached far and wide in drafting claims related to the
invention. This Part will focus on a few of the claims that represent the prob-
lems with the patent and with the resulting trial court opinion.
DNA is a molecule that carries genetic information and is made up of a se-
quence of nucleotides. The order of the nucleotides creates a blueprint that the
cell will use to perform its functions, including making particular proteins and
reproducing itself.
Finding a relevant sequence is not a simple matter. Researchers begin with
a pool of data from a large number of patients. It takes time, diligence, and,
most importantly, creativity to sift and sort the data, looking for the genetic
mistake that may be relevant to some extent for a particular segment of the pa-
tients examined.
It is important to note the limitations inherent in this type of diagnostic
technology. First, the variation does not affect all women who have breast and
ovarian cancer. Second, the presence of the biomarker does not mean that the
patient will definitely develop the disease. Finding the biomarker in a patient
suggests no more than an increased statistical probability that the patient will
develop the related disease.
Finally, although teasing a genetic biomarker from the data can provide an
enormously valuable tool for researching the disease and identifying treatment
methods, it would be a mistake to suggest any simple causal relationship be-
tween the biomarker and the disease process. A biomarker may provide no
more than a clue in a complex and dynamic human puzzle.
The patent holder in Molecular Pathology claimed an isolated piece of
DNA containing the nucleotide sequence that translates into either the BRCAJ
or BRCA2 protein. In other words, having developed parameters for a set of
proteins that may be relevant to some extent in some set of circumstances, the
patent holder identified the sequence that codes for the worrisome proteins and
claimed the isolated form of that sequence.
The patent holder did not claim the sequence in its form in the human
body. The cell and its components as they exist in the human body constitute a
natural product, and the Supreme Court has suggested that the discovery of a
natural product is not a patentable invention, even if that product was previous-
ly unknown. 34 Thus, the patent holder in Molecular Pathology claimed the se-
34. See, e.g., Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (noting in a case concerning whether living
products constitute patentable subject matter that "a new mineral discovered in the earth or a
new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter"); Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130;
cf Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (noting, in a case related to process patents




quence in a form outside the human body, isolated and separated from the re-
mainder of the cellular components.
As described above, DNA is made up of a string of paired nucleotides. Se-
parating out a portion of the DNA strand from the remainder of the strand, and
from the other cumbersome parts of the human cell, allows researchers to begin
working with the strand in a laboratory setting. It is one step in the process of
manipulating and combining genes and proteins in ways that, for example,
create medications more effective than what the human body can create.
In addition to the isolated segment, the patent holder also claimed a prod-
uct called cDNA. As a cell goes through the complex process of translating the
DNA sequence through messenger RNA and into the proper protein, certain
portions of the sequence are spliced away. cDNA is the mirror image of the se-
quence at the point at which all noncoding regions have been removed.35
In other words, think of that wonderful double helix one often sees in illu-
strations of biology. Imagine opening the double helix like a zipper, and on half
of the zipper, separating out the relevant part and then splicing out the noncod-
ing regions. cDNA is the mirror image of that. In simplified form, one can de-
scribe cDNA as the mirror image of the uninterrupted coding sequence.36
cDNA does not normally exist in the human body, and is naturally created
only through the operation of certain retroviruses. Transforming normal DNA
into cDNA, however, provides a more efficient tool for researchers and health
care professionals who wish to study, diagnose, and treat the disease associated
with a gene. In particular, cDNA is tailored to work with bacteria, the organ-
isms commonly used to manipulate human genes and proteins in a laboratory
setting. Bacteria do not have the machinery to shorten natural DNA, so we have
to create special uninterrupted coding sequences for them. If given an uninter-
rupted coding sequence, bacteria can translate that sequence into the proper
protein.
Another advantage of cDNA over natural DNA is that the shorter length
makes many laboratory procedures possible that could not be performed effec-
tively with natural, full-length DNA. In other words, the inventors have created
an altered version of DNA that is tailored to work in a laboratory setting in a
way that natural DNA would not.
Creating cDNA also may be useful in altering or repairing genes in their
natural setting. In the world of gene therapy, which is still in experimental stag-
es, cDNA potentially could be used to bind with the natural gene and render it
inactive.
In addition to product claims to isolated DNA and cDNA, the patents in
Molecular Pathology also included method claims. For example, the patent
35. While the single-stranded cDNA is a mirror image, it is the double-stranded ver-
sion that is frequently used in lab applications.
36. In the human body, the uninterrupted coding sequence exists in the form of RNA,
not DNA.
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holder claimed the method of determining whether a person is predisposed to
the relevant form of cancer by comparing the person's gene sequence to the se-
quence in nature that codes for either BRCAl or BRCA2.37 The patent holder
also claimed the method of determining whether a potential cancer therapeutic
is effective by growing cells containing the relevant gene and determining
whether those cells grow more slowly in the presence of the therapeutic.
The proper test for determining whether a method patent satisfies the sub-
ject matter requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101 was the focus of the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Bilski v. Kappos.39 In In re Bilski, the Federal Circuit
had declared that the sole test for determining whether a patent on a method
falls within patentable subject matter should be the "machine-or-
transformation" test.40 Under the machine-or-transformation test, a method pa-
tent falls within proper subject matter only if "(1) it is tied to a particular ma-
chine or aparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state
or thing.' I
The Bilski patent covered a method of hedging risk in the energy commodi-
ties industry. Although the case specifically addressed patentability of business
methods, the decision had the explosive potential to affect a variety of other
method claims, including those related to software and biotechnology. For ex-
ample, how could the Court limit business method patents, which are essential-
ly a method of doing a business activity, without also limiting software patents,
which are often expressed in terms of a method of getting a machine to do
something? Moreover, how could the Court limit patents on a method of doing
a business activity without also limiting biotechnology therapeutic and diagnos-
tic patents, which are often expressed as methods of diagnosing or treating a
disease by doing something? The potential implications of any decision
prompted a staggering number of amicus briefs, as well as considerable heart-
burn in the industries potentially affected.
In a set of divided opinions, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Cir-
cuit's logic and held that the machine-or-transformation test is not the sole test
for determining patentable subject matter for method patents. 42 The Court
37. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 213-14.
38. Id. at 214.
39. 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
40. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959-60 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
41. Id. at 954.
42. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 3218. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court,
except as to Parts II.B.2 and II.C.2. Id at 3221. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas
and Alito joined the opinion in full. See id at 3218. Justice Scalia joined the opinion except
as to Parts II.B.2 and I.C.2. See id. at 3218, 3221. Justice Stevens filed an opinion concur-
ring in the judgment, in which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor joined. Id at 3231.




pointed to language in its prior cases suggesting that, while such a test may be
an important clue or investigative tool, it is not the exclusive measure.43
Perhaps the most striking part of the Supreme Court's decision was its sug-
gestion that the Federal Circuit has been wrong across the board on everything
it has said in more than a decade of opinions in this area. Specifically, the Su-
preme Court declared that "nothing in today's opinion should be read as en-
dorsing interpretations of § 101 that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit has used in the past."4
The Court chose very limited language in crafting the Bilski decision,
which seemed to reflect the Court's concern over the impact that any business
method decision might have on other areas, such as software and biotechnolo-
gy. Cases over the last forty years have tied this area of law into a Gordian
knot, making extrication quite difficult. 45 In particular, the Court noted the fol-
lowing:
Rather than adopting categorical rules that might have wide-ranging and unfo-
reseen impacts, the Court resolves this case narrowly on the basis of this
Court's decisions in Benson, Flook, and Diehr, which show that petitioners'
claims are not patentable processes because they are attempts to patent ab-
stract ideas. Indeed, all members of the Court agree that the patent application
at issue here falls outside of § 101 because it claims an abstract idea.
With this language, the Court seemed to limit the Bilski decision to abstract
ideas. The wording, however, creates some uncertainty over the extent to which
the Court is inclined to apply the same logic to software or other types of me-
thod cases. One could read the Court's language to convey nothing more than
the fact that business method patents attempting to block abstract ideas are un-
patentable based on discussions in Benson, Flook, and Diehr regarding abstract
ideas. Benson, Flook, and Diehr, however, concerned computer-related inven-
tions.47 Thus, one might be tempted to speculate that the Court intends to apply
similar logic in software cases, or, at the very least, the Court sees the Benson-
Flook-Diehr line of cases as offering a viable path for deciding issues related to
process patents in general. The broader implication, however, would be troub-
ling. Benson, Flook, and Diehr were decided in the 1970s and early 1980s.
43. See id. at 3226-27.
44. Id. at 3231.
45. For a detailed history of how various court opinions have slowly tied this Gordian
knot and an explanation of how to untangle it, see ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT
RIGHTS (forthcoming) (manuscript at ch. 4) (on file with author) (discussing patentable sub-
ject matter in a chapter entitled "Where Do Processes of Nature End and Processes of Hu-
man Inventions Begin?").
46. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229-30.
47. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584
(1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
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Computer-related inventions, not to mention our understanding of those inven-
tions, have progressed significantly in the interim.48
Despite a narrowly tailored opinion, the Supreme Court did stress one im-
portant point in Bilski. In rejecting the patent, the Court noted that "[a]llowing
petitioners to patent risk hedging would pre-empt use of this approach in all
fields, and would effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea."49 In oth-
er words, it appears that preemption remains important in determining whether
a method patent falls within the patentable subject matter described by § 101, at
least in the context of the facts of the case. The problem with the Bilski patent
claim, therefore, is that a patent holder would be able to fully block, that is
preempt, an abstract idea. Implicit in the Court's analysis, of course, is the no-
tion that patent law does not grant rights in abstract ideas.
One will not hear many academics express the following view in regards to
the Bilski opinion, but I believe the Supreme Court did the right thing. The
Court followed a maxim familiar to those in the life sciences that, above all
else, one must do no harm. The Justices did not have a good solution for a sub-
ject matter test at the crucial intersection of computer software, life sciences,
and business methods. Thus, the wisest course of action was to be patient and
to allow the conversation to continue.
Personalized medicine cases, like Molecular Pathology, can lead us out of
the morass, and the notion of preemption is critical to finding the right path. In
gene-related inventions, preemption problems can emerge not just in the con-
text of attempts to tie up an abstract idea, but also in the context of attempts to
tie up a natural phenomenon. The notion of preemption is important for under-
standing what is permissible and what is problematic with the claims in Mole-
cular Pathology and similar cases.
The Supreme Court has stated repeatedly that one may not patent laws of
nature or natural phenomena, noting that these are basic tools of scientific and
technological work.5 o Inventions may certainly take advantage of such building
blocks. In fact, it would be difficult to imagine an invention that did not use
laws of nature to some extent. One should ask, however, whether the patent
holder is preempting a natural phenomenon, rather than creating an application
of that natural phenomenon and controlling only the application created.51
In answering the question, it is important to think about the requirements of
patentability as a whole. Patent law has become too segmented in thinking
about the elements of patentability, and we risk losing the ability to see the sys-
48. For an explanation of problems with the Benson-Flook-Diehr line of cases, and
how to resolve those problems, see FELDMAN, supra note 45 (manuscript at ch. 4).
49. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231.
50. E.g., Benson, 409 U.S. at 67.
51. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187 (stating that respondent "d[id] not seek to pre-empt"
the use of the well-known Arrhenius mathematical formula but "only to foreclose from oth-
ers the use of that equation in conjunction with all of the other steps in their [patented]
process" in holding that the claim satisfies § 101).
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tem as a dynamic whole, with all of the parts working together. In particular, it
makes little sense to think about patentable subject matter in isolation from the
other elements of patentability and limiting principles of patent law. Rather,
one should analyze patentable subject matter in the following manner: consi-
dering the limitations of the patent system as a whole, are we likely to have
preemption problems with the subject matter of this patent?
For example, early generations of biomarker tests involved a one-to-one re-
lationship between a single physical phenomenon and a disease state. A classic
example is the relationship between elevated blood sugar levels and diabetes.
Although the discovery of this relationship is tremendously important in the di-
agnosis and treatment of diabetes, allowing an inventor to patent that phenome-
non would raise preemption concerns. Discovering the fact that A occurs with B
is no different from discovering a property of a natural substance or discovering
how a biological process unfolds, neither of which would be patentable. Thus,
when the invention constitutes no more than the straightforward measurement
of a single biomarker, one could easily argue that the invention merely recog-
nizes a natural phenomenon.
At the other end of the spectrum are modem personalized medicine diag-
nostic methods. These may involve hundreds of biomarkers and complex statis-
tical modeling that identifies patterns or groupings of markers that may indicate
the benefit of a particular treatment approach. In addition, the biomarkers are
usually selected and statistically modeled to take into account issues such as
human genetic and environmental variations. 52 These inventions do not merely
reflect nature; they are interpretative models of nature.53 As I have described in
detail elsewhere, patenting such models should not raise preemption concerns,
given that they leave plenty of room for the development of other models. 54 In
addition, their probabilistic, interpretative approach provides reassurance that
the inventions are not preempting anyone's actual natural state.55
The diagnostic claims in Molecular Pathology fall somewhere between the
two extremes. The invention is indeed a correlation involving a single biomark-
er, and it is one that does not require an extensive amount of processing to read
the results. Nevertheless, the presence of the genetic marker creates only a sta-
tistical probability, rather than providing a clear one-to-one correlation with a
disease state. As such, the inventions fall more on the side of the type of data
sifting and interpretation that characterizes the more complex personalized di-
agnostics and less on the side of a simple fact of nature. Reasonable minds
could differ, nevertheless, on this point.
52. For a detailed explanation of patentable subject matter in the context of persona-
lized medicine, see FELDMAN, supra note 45 (manuscript at ch. 4).
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. Such personalized medicine inventions are a statistical approximation based on an
amalgamation of interpretive data; they could not possibly represent the natural state of any
individual living being.
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Far greater problems exist, however, with the therapeutic research claims.
The patent holder in Molecular Pathology essentially claimed the method of
determining whether a cancer therapeutic is effective, which is described as
growing cells carrying the mutation both in the presence and absence of the
therapeutic agent and comparing to see if one has a slower growth rate. The
process of growing cells and comparing growth rates is not new. Neither is the
process of growing cells with genetic mutations and measuring whether a the-
rapeutic slows the growth of the cells. Like the concept of hedging in Bilski, the
concept of testing a therapeutic against a drug target is well known, and the pa-
tent holder offers no novel testing or subtle interpretive information.
The therapeutic research claim is somewhat reminiscent of claims rejected
by the Federal Circuit in Rochester v. Searle.56 There, the patent holder tried to
claim methods for selectively inhibiting certain enzyme activity in a human pa-
tient. The patent holder, however, had not identified an example of a compound
that would work. The court rejected the claim under 35 U.S.C. § 112 as a fail-
ure to properly describe the invention.57 My own view is that to claim an entire
group of things, it would make sense to require a showing of at least some
members of the group, as well as a reason to believe that the entire group is ap-
propriately related to the members demonstrated.
In Molecular Pathology, the patent holder has tried to control all potential
therapeutic approaches without having provided a single one, let alone a reason
to believe that the group is appropriately related to any demonstrated members.
Claiming a method of determining efficacy of treatment is simply an attempt to
more creatively draft Rochester-style claims that would reach an entire catego-
ry of items whose identity remains undetermined.
The more interesting question involves the claims to particular DNA and
cDNA sequences created outside the human body. These are claims for prod-
ucts, rather than the claims for methods described in the prior paragraphs. Giv-
en that the DNA sequences occur naturally in some people at particular points
56. Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
57. G.D. Searle, 357 F.3d at 923; see also Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598
F.3d 1336, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en bane) ("[A] sufficient description of a genus . . .
requires the disclosure of either a representative number of species falling within the scope
of the genus or structural features common to the members of the genus so that one of skill
in the art can 'visualize or recognize' the members of the genus." (quoting Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568-69 (Fed. Cir. 1997))). See generally
Robin C. Feldman, The Inventor's Contribution, 2005 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 6 (describing the
history of the written description requirement and arguing that a separate written description
is unnecessary if the enablement requirement is properly construed).
58. Cf Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(noting that a functional description might satisfy the written description requirement if
"coupled with a known or disclosed correlation between function and structure, or some
combination of such characteristics" (emphasis omitted) (quoting Guidelines for Examina-
tion of Patent Applications Under the 35 U.S.C. 112, 1, "Written Description" Require-
ment, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099, 1106 (Jan. 5, 2001))).
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in the DNA strands of their cells, the operative question is whether the product
created is sufficiently distinct from nature that it should be considered a human
invention. In other words, is this a product of nature or of human invention? As
described above, one can certainly take advantage of nature and its properties
in creating a new product. Analogous to using laws of nature in a method pa-
tent, many inventions rely on nature and natural properties, whether that is bac-
teria's ability to produce proteins or DNA's ability to serve as a blueprint. The
relevant inquiry, however, concerns whether the inventor has created some-
thing sufficiently distinct from what nature provides.
The trial court in Molecular Pathology analyzed the question according to
case law on the purification of natural products. For example, in the 1873 case
American Wood-Paper Co., the Supreme Court rejected a product patent for a
new version of paper pulp that did not require mechanical treatment before be-
ing made into paper. 59 The Court reasoned that although the patent holder
might have invented a better process for treating wood with only chemical ra-
ther than mechanical means in order to obtain cellulose for making paper, the
invention did not constitute a new product. In particular, the Court noted the
following in dicta: "Thus, if one should discover a mode or contrive a process
by which prussic acid could be obtained from a subject in which it is not now
known to exist, he might have a patent for his process, but not for prussic ac-
id." 60 In a similar vein, a group of lower court cases from the 1920s and 1930s
held that purification of a product of nature generally does not yield a new pa-
tentable product.61
Describing gene patents as analogous to purification of a natural product
might have made sense in the 1980s and 1990s. In those days, researchers did
physically isolate and purify portions of DNA from human cells to obtain a
gene. Even cDNA was obtained from purified mRNA.
Although the classic methods are still practiced, "purification" is a descrip-
tion increasingly at odds with what is actually done in the field. In most cases,
the modem creation of genetic inventions no longer requires purification. To-
day's laboratories can use chemical synthesis to build, from the ground up, the
59. Am. Wood-Paper Co. v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 566 (1874).
60. Id. at 594.
61. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641, 649 (3d Cir. 1928) (inva-
lidating patent on the grounds that the patent holder had merely produced tungsten in its pure
form, and discovered no more than the natural qualities of pure tungsten); In re Merz, 97
F.2d 599, 601 (C.C.P.A. 1938) (finding patent holder not entitled to a patent on what
amounts to ultramarine produced to a greater degree of purity unless the new product is of
such purity that it differs not only in degree but in kind such that there is a new utility); In re
Marden (Marden 11), 47 F.2d 958, 959-60 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (rejecting patent on purified va-
nadium which resulted in greater ductility on the grounds that the greater malleability is one
of its inherent qualities); In re Marden (Marden 1), 47 F.2d 957 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (holding
that the appellant was not entitled to a patent on the supposedly new substance, ductile ura-
nium, on the ground that one may not patent a product of nature or the inherent natural quali-
ties of that metal).
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physical DNA or cDNA sequence that can be used in the lab. In fact, one can
order the required sequence from an outside vendor who will use chemical syn-.
thesis to construct the product according to specifications. This is not purifica-
tion, and we should look to other analogies to determine whether the invention
satisfies patentable subject matter.
Constructing a gene through chemical synthesis looks much like putting
together mechanical parts to make a machine. One has a variety of nuts and
bolts, and the goal is to build a machine that can perform a desired task in the
laboratory, in this case, a task that nature performs in the body. To the extent
that gene-related inventions are analogous to constructing a machine, they
should certainly constitute patentable subject matter.
One should also note that simply attaching nuts and bolts together will not
yield a patentable invention. To satisfy all the elements of patentability, an in-
ventor must be able to identify a use for the invention, as well as demonstrate
that the invention is novel, nonobvious, and sufficiently described and
enabled.62 One may see many combinations of mechanical parts strewn around
a tinkerer's basement, but none will yield a patentable invention unless the in-
ventor can at least identify a use. Similarly, much of the human genome has
now been sequenced, which would give researchers the necessary information
to construct various gene "machines" in the lab. No researcher could file for a
patent on a particular gene machine in a laboratory setting, however, unless the
researcher has been able to develop a specific use for it. The same would be
true of a genetic mutation. Sequencing projects and databases may contain de-
scriptions of numerous mutations, but those mutations cannot be constructed
into a patentable product until a researcher can develop a use that is specific to
that mutation. In other words, others in the art may know how to tinker in a
way that puts nucleotide pieces together, but the inventor is the one who finds a
use for it, in addition to satisfying other requirements of patentability.
Finally, the fact that genes exist in a natural form in the human body
should not prevent patenting of genes in laboratory form. Although nature may
have offspring that can perform a particular function, one may still make a pa-
tentable invention by creating an artificial version of that offspring. Birds can
fly, but if an inventor were able to construct an artificial bird capable of flight,
that artificial bird would represent an extraordinary and patentable invention,
although the patent certainly would not cover nature's own avian version.
These issues are extraordinarily complex and difficult to wrap one's mind
around. It is not surprising that courts and commentators are tempted to use a
familiar analogy, such as purification, even when the metaphor fits poorly with
modem scientific practice. If one were to adopt a purification analogy, howev-
er, genetic DNA and cDNA sequences should still constitute patentable subject
matter. Purification cases themselves suggest that a product purified from a
natural substance can constitute patentable subject matter under certain cir-
62. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2006).
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cumstances. For example, the predecessor court to the Federal Circuit ex-
plained in In re Merz that although, in general, one cannot get a patent for a
product that merely has a greater degree of purity, "[t]he exception is that if the
process produces an article of such purity that it differs not only in degree but
in kind it may be patentable. If it differs in kind, it may have a new utility in
which invention may rest." 63
The Merz court was echoing a notion that the Supreme Court had hinted at
in American Wood-Paper. In rejecting a patent on a version of wood pulp, the
Supreme Court suggested that a different use could possibly form the basis of a
distinction between an unpatentable purification and a patentable new prod-
uct.64 The question can be framed in the following terms: is the invention not
only new but also new in a way that matters by opening new avenues for hu-
mans to do something that could not be done previously?
Judge Learned Hand explored the idea more extensively in Parke-Davis,
which concerned a patent on a therapeutic product extracted from the supraren-
al glands of animals.65 Judge Hand upheld the patent arguing that while the in-
ventor
was the first to make it available for any use by removing it from the other
gland-tissue in which it was found, and, while it is of course possible logically
to call this a purification of the principle, it became for every practical purpose
a new thing commercially and therapeutically. . . . The line between different
substances and degrees of the same substance is to be drawn rather from the
common usages of men than from nice considerations of dialectic. 66
One could argue endlessly over the extent to which Judge Hand's discus-
sion constitutes dicta.67 One could also argue that the purification cases are too
63. 97 F.2d at 601; cf Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931)
("Addition of borax to the rind of natural fruit does not produce from the raw material an
article for use which possesses a new or distinctive form, quality, or property.").
64. See Am. Wood-Paper, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) at 594 ("The substance of the products,
therefore, was the same, and so were their uses. The design and the end of their production
was the same, no matter how or from what they were produced.").
65. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911),
af'd in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912).
66. Id.
67. The trial court in Molecular Pathology claimed that Parke-Davis did not address
patentable subject matter. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("Although Myriad argues that the hold-
ing in Parke-Davis establishes that the purification of a natural product necessarily renders it
patentable, the opinion, read closely, fails to support such a conclusion. The question before
the court in Parke-Davis was one of novelty (a modem-day § 102 question), not of patenta-
ble subject matter (the § 101 question before this Court)."). Judge Hand did, indeed, begin
the Parke-Davis opinion with a decision relating to whether the claimed form had been an-
ticipated by the prior art. See 189 F. 95 at 101-02. It is in the section on technical objec-
tions-that is, things other than novelty-that Judge Hand turned to whether the patent was
for a new composition of matter, in other words, whether the invention constituted patenta-
ble subject matter. See id. at 102-04. Although one can argue over which part of that section
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old to be of much use. For example, the most relevant Supreme Court case,
American Wood-Paper, was written in 1873,68 Parke-Davis was written in
1911,69 and other purification cases were written three-quarters of a century
ago. 70 Our understanding of chemical and biological products has advanced
considerably since that time. Nevertheless, one so often finds the wisdom of
Learned Hand to be compelling, and Parke-Davis is no exception. In the words
of the classic Robinson treatise from the late 1800s, "[A]ny frivolous or trifling
article or operation not aiding in the progress nor increasing the possessions of
the human race, whatever be its novelty, and whatever skill has been involved
in its production, does not fall within the class of useful inventions nor become
the subject-matter of a patent."71 In other words, the hallmark of something
worth patenting is that it is useful to society, either by aiding in our progress or
helping to bring about an increase in our possessions. One can, therefore, an-
swer by analogy the question of whether something is sufficiently different
from its natural counterpart. If one wants to ask whether a difference matters,
that is, whether the difference is more than merely frivolous or trifling, that dif-
ference should be evaluated in terms of whether the substance allows society to
do something new that aids in our progress or helps bring about an increase in
should be considered precedent and which part should be considered dicta, Parke-Davis cer-
tainly reached a decision on patentable subject matter. Specifically, Judge Hand said:
Nor is the patent only for a degree of purity, and therefore not for a new "composition of
matter." As I have already shown, it does not include a salt, and no one had ever isolated a
substance which was not in salt form, and which was anything like Takamine's. Indeed,
Sadtler supposes it to exist as a natural salt, and that the base was an original production of
Takamine's. That was a distinction not in degree, but in kind. But, even if it were merely an
extracted product without change, there is no rule that such products are not patentable. Ta-
kamine was the first to make it available for any use by removing it from the other gland-
tissue in which it was found, and, while it is of course possible logically to call this a purifi-
cation of the principle, it became for every practical purpose a new thing commercially and
therapeutically. That was a good ground for a patent. That the change here resulted in ample
practical differences is fully proved. Everyone, not already saturated with scholastic distinc-
tions, would recognize that Takamine's crystals were not merely the old dried glands in a
purer state, nor would his opinion change if he learned that the crystals were obtained from
the glands by a process of eliminating the inactive organic substances. The line between dif-
ferent substances and degrees of the same substance is to be drawn rather from the common
usages of men than from nice considerations of dialectic.
Id. at 103 (citations omitted).
68. 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 566 (1873).
69. 189 F. 95 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911).
70. See Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1 (1931); Gen. Elec. Co. v.
De Forest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1928); In re Merz, 97 F.2d 599 (C.C.P.A. 1938);
Marden II, 47 F.2d 958 (C.C.P.A. 1931); Marden 1, 47 F.2d 957 (C.C.P.A. 1931). Funk
Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130-31 (1948), is often mentioned in the
group of cases. Although it concerned a combination of bacteria rather than a purification,
the Court rejected the patent, expounding on the difference between uncovering nature's
qualities and something that constitutes a product of human invention. The Court may have
been distracted, however, by the fact that the patent holder tried to claim all bacteria that
might behave in a certain way, rather than simply the ones identified in the patent. See id.
71. 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 339
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1890).
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our possession. Judge Hand's suggestion that a purification differs from nature
when it allows us to do what we could not have done with that which is found
in nature makes eminently good sense.
One could argue that the approach mixes questions of utility and novelty
into the subject matter inquiry.7 The elements of patentability are conceptually
related, however, and one can easily use the same information for different
purposes in different inquiries. For subject matter patentability, the question is
not whether the substance is new relative to other invented substances (novelty)
or whether it is sufficiently useful (utility). Rather, for subject matter patenta-
bility, the question is whether the invented substance is different from a product
that nature has provided. In answering that question, we should ask whether the
invention allows us to accomplish something that we could not accomplish
with the natural product.
Applying that yardstick to isolated DNA and cDNA would suggest that
such products should be considered human inventions, rather than the handi-
work of nature. Natural human cells, even ones that have been separated from
their body of origin, will have many limitations for use in the lab. For example,
it is difficult to get the cells to proliferate in culture in sufficient number to
support modem biochemical, genetic, diagnostic, and therapeutic techniques.73
In addition, cDNA is an artificial DNA that does not normally exist in nat-
ural cells but is created by researchers in test tubes. The natural human DNA
will not operate effectively with bacteria, the workhorses of modem molecular
genetic technologies. Creating an altered version of the human DNA, one that
can be used effectively in the lab, facilitates a world of opportunities in bio-
medical research. It is precisely what Judge Hand was referring to when he
suggested that one could find the line between different substances and degrees
of the same substance, not by clever wordplay, but by looking at what can be
done with the substance that is claimed as new.74
I suspect that beneath concerns in the area of patenting isolated genes and
gene variations is a question related to preemption. By allowing a patent on
DNA segments in laboratory form, even if those segments are entirely artificial,
are we indirectly allowing the patent holder to tie up the natural phenomenon of
72. See Allen K. Yu, Why It Might Be Time to Eliminate Genomics Patents, Together
with the Natural Extracts Doctrine Supporting Such Patents, 47 IDEA 659, 702 (2007) (ar-
guing that Parke-Davis improperly mixed utility questions into subject matter patentability).
73. See ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 2, at 470 ("Most biochemical procedures require
obtaining large numbers of cells and then physically disrupting them to isolate their compo-
nents [such as protein, DNA, and RNA]. . .. To obtain as much information as possible
about an individual cell type, biologists have developed ways of dissociating cells from tis-
sues and separating the various types[,] . . . result[ing] in a relatively homogeneous popula-
tion of cells that can then be analyzed--either directly or after their number has been greatly
increased by allowing the cells to proliferate as a pure culture."); see also id. at 472 (describ-
ing how cell cultures "allow[] the number of cells to be greatly increased and their complex
behavior to be studied under the strictly defined conditions of a culture dish").
74. See Parke-Davis, 189 F. at 103.
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the gene itself in the human body? If so, how can we tie up a gene, antibody, or
other protein, or even an artificial version of those, when there is so much that
we do not understand?
This type of preemption concern is particularly acute in the biological
sciences, where elements play more than one role and interact on multiple le-
vels. Consider the case of the patent on the CCR5 receptor. In 1996, Human
Genome Sciences applied for a patent on a genetic sequence that coded for a
particular protein. The company used computer modeling to compare the se-
quence and its rotein to other known sequences and proteins, in an effort to
predict utility. Based on this work, the company filed for a patent predicting
the function of the protein from its similarity to a category of proteins known as
chemokine receptors. 76 To satisfy utility, the company described the functions
of such known receptors, listing them as relating to the very broad fields of "in-
flammation, immune reactions, allergies, and arthritis." 77 The patent claims in-
cluded rights to the genetic sequence and the receptor it codes for.
While the application was pending, AIDS researchers independently were
researching CCR5, a receptor that the HIV virus uses to enter and infect cells.7 8
Having fewer than both copies of the CCR5 gene can increase resistance to
HIV infection: having only one copy can slow infection and having no copies
at all can create strong resistance to infection. 79 The Human Genome Se-
quence's receptor turned out to be CCR5. Once the patent issued, it covered
nearly all uses of the CCR5 receptor.80 Critics have charged that the patent ef-
fectively precluded research, diagnosis, and treatment of AIDS in ways related
to the CCR5 receptor without a license from the company.81
The Patent and Trademark Office would be much less likely to grant Hu-
man Genome Sequence's patent today, given current utility rules. Current rules
require that an inventor articulate a more particularized use for an invention
75. See Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts over Patenting Human DNA Se-
quences in the United States and the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licens-
ing and a Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1623, 1625 n.1 1 (2001) (describing the
CCR5 patent application and homologous sequencing).
76. See id.; The Fate of Gene Patents Under the New Utility Guidelines, 2001 DUKE L.
& TECH. REv. 8, 6.
77. The Fate of Gene Patents Under the New Utility Guidelines, supra note 76, 6.
78. See Lori B. Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma: Balancing Commercial Incen-
tives with Health Needs, 2 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 65, 87 (2002); see also The Fate of
Gene Patents Under the New Utility Guidelines, supra note 76, 1 6 (describing the CCR5
receptor). Receptors are themselves proteins. TEXTBOOK OF BIOCHEMISTRY WITH CLINICAL
CORRELATIONS 936 (Thomas M. Devlin ed., 5th ed. 2002). Thus, descriptions of the CCR5
controversies can be confusing to those without a science background because the descrip-
tions use the term "protein" to refer to both the thing that the CCR5 sequence creates and the
thing that the creation binds to.
79. See Andrews, supra note 78.
80. Shanshan Zhang, Proposing Resolutions to the Insufficient Gene Patent System, 20
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1139, 1161(2004).
8 1. See id.
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than something as broad as "a wide variety of uses . .. including inflammation,
immune reactions, allergies, and arthritis."82 The solution is important for un-
derstanding the extent to which problems flow from setting the appropriate
reach of a patent, rather than from patentable subject matter. As I suggested
above, one should analyze patentable subject matter with the following ques-
tion: considering the limitations of the patent system on the whole, are we like-
ly to have preemption problems with the subject matter of the patent? From this
perspective, the problem with CCR5 and similar examples lies not with the fact
that the patent system allows inventors to patent genes, proteins, receptors, and
the like, but rather with the extent of the reach that is allowed.
I have argued in the past that rules allowing patent holders to reach beyond
the state of knowledge at the time of the invention are wreaking havoc across
disparate doctrines, as courts struggle to avoid the uncomfortable implications
of those rules. 83 For example, the notion that an inventor who creates a ma-
chine can control that machine regardless of how it is made or how it is used
may make sense for mechanical inventions, but it makes little sense in the con-
text of uncertain arts such as biotechnology.84 It is this discordance that is
creating distortions across a number of patent law doctrines, and it would be
unfortunate to allow that discomfort to distort patentable subject matter as well.
The solution lies in properly limiting the scope of the allowed claim. In a
case like Molecular Pathology, this limitation could be accomplished through
the disclosure requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112. Perhaps a properly drawn pa-
tent in this arena would say something to the effect that the inventor claims an
isolated sequence of DNA (or a sequence of cDNA) containing the nucleotide
sequence that transmits information for the creation of either the BRCA1 or
BRCA2 protein for the purposes of breast cancer diagnosis in a designated pa-
tient population. In other words, the inventor would not control anything that
the sequence might relate to outside of this population or for reasons other than
this purpose. This would limit the inventor to the state of knowledge in the art
at the time of the invention plus anything that the inventor has contributed, but
no more. This may not satisfy all critics, but it respects the need for providing
incentives in this exciting and robust industry while limiting those incentives to
the inventor's actual contribution.
I should address the concern that the types of limitations I propose are
field-of-use restrictions, and field-of-use restrictions are problematic. In partic-
ular, the Supreme Court has suggested, in decisions related to process patents,
that field-of-use restrictions are of no benefit in deciding whether an invention
82. The Fate of Gene Patents Under the New Utility Guidelines, supra note 76, 6.
83. See generally Feldman, supra note 33.
84. See id at 2-3 ("A doorknob is a doorknob, regardless of whether it is made of
wood or glass. Can we really say . .. that an antibody is an antibody, no matter how it works
or what materials it is made out of? . .. [A]re we prepared to say that an antibody is an anti-
body at a time when our knowledge of why particular antibodies arise in the body and how
they fit into the body's overall organic processes is limited?").
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constitutes patentable subject matter.85 The logic is that one cannot save an at-
tempt to patent a law of nature by asking for the right to apply the law only in a
particular field. For example, one could not claim the law of gravity by limiting
it only to uses in the field of bridge building.
Resistance to field-of-use restrictions may be wrapped up in an improper
line of logic that began to emerge during the early computer cases.86 The logic
is as follows: Computer programs are mathematical formulas; mathematical
formulas are laws of nature; laws of nature are not patentable and cannot be
rendered patentable by limiting their application to a particular field of use.
Therefore, computer programs cannot be rendered patentable by limiting their
application to a particular field of use.
There are significant flaws in this logical progression. For example, we are
accustomed to seeing laws of nature expressed in mathematical language, such
as E = mc 2. This does not mean, however, that everything expressed in mathe-
matical language is a law of nature, or even a formula. In particular, the fact
that computer programs are expressed in a formulaic language that looks
somewhat like math to the layperson does not answer the question of whether
the concepts underlying the computer program are analogous to laws of nature
or even formulas. One must not confuse the content of something with the lan-
guage in which that content is expressed, but must look at what the language
represents. Comic books and the Constitution may both be expressed in Eng-
lish, but their content is quite different.
The type of restrictions I am suggesting should be understood as distinct
from the field-of-use restrictions characterized by the bridge-building example.
Proper claims limitations are an understandable extension of the notion that
while inventors may make use of laws of nature and natural phenomena, they
may only patent a particular application of that law or phenomenon. Claims
drafted in the manner I suggest provide assurance that we are allowing patents
on an application of a law of nature or a natural phenomenon. They should not
be swept into the category of improper field-of-use restrictions.
Taking this approach also provides a bridge between product claims and
process claims in inventions related to genetics. The reach of product claims,
when limited as I have suggested, would harmonize with the reach of process
claims I suggested earlier in this Article.87
One could argue that the reach of all product and process claims should be
harmonized as a general matter. It is particularly appropriate to do so with gene
claims, in light of their nature as a product that has echoes of process. In short,
85. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010).
86. This logic is described in detail in FELDMAN, supra note 45 (manuscript at ch. 4).
87. See supra text accompanying notes 51-54; see also FELDMAN, supra note 45 (ma-
nuscript at ch. 4) (providing a detailed explanation of the proper delineation of process




with properly limited claims, genes as the subject matter of patents would be
unproblematic, given their limitation to the state of the art and the state of dis-
closure by the inventor.
If genetic patents are limited in the manner outlined above, how would the
individual from whom the cells originated stand to benefit? Even if court rul-
ings had the effect of allowing an individual to isolate a particular gene from
his or her own cells and compare that gene to known mutations without fear of
infringing a patent, few individuals could do it themselves.
The benefit to individuals would be indirect. Limiting genetic patents as
described above would maintain incentives for genetic research, while prevent-
ing individual patent holders from preempting natural phenomena. Such limita-
tions leave more territory open for researchers who want to study genes and for
those who want to develop competing approaches and downstream products.
Those effects would increase the avenues available to individual patients who
wish to understand, respond to, and perhaps even change their genetic profile.
I do want to be clear that I am not suggesting here that individuals should
be given rights related to the information in their individual cells, regardless of
whether those cells are inside the body. That would truly require a paradigm
shift, and although I have proposed such a shift in a different forum, this Article
is intended to suggest a more modest and practical approach.8 8 A careful cur-
tailment of patent rights, however, should better reflect the interests of society
as a whole in maintaining access for scientific research and innovation, inter-
ests that should redound to the benefit of the individual.
CONCLUSION
Scientific research related to the components of human life continues to
produce astounding insights and therapeutic treatments. Our understandable en-
thusiasm for these advances, as well as our piecemeal approach, has yielded a
strange patchwork of doctrinal rules. It is worth considering how the pieces fit
together as a whole and whether the resulting picture properly emphasizes the
interests of society and of the individual. A careful and more considered appli-
cation of both property and intellectual property doctrines should provide more
appropriate respect for the disparate interests in a way that is consistent with
the doctrinal and theoretical roots in both areas. Perhaps in the end, it is our
body, anyway.
88. For an approach that would involve a more paradigmatic shift, see Feldman, supra
note 9.
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